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Due to its controversial nature, hate speech prosecution of anti-immigration politicians is likely 
to affect citizens’ democratic support. Using a web experiment in which participants are 
exposed to a manipulated television news story about hate speech, we test these potential 
effects in the Dutch context. We demonstrate that effects on democratic support are driven by 
(dis)agreement with ideas expressed by the prosecuted politician in his alleged hate speech 
rather than by identification with his party. While a decision to not prosecute a politician does 
not seem to affect democratic support, a decision to prosecute a politician for hate speech 
decreases democratic support among citizens with anti-immigration attitudes, and increases 
democratic support among citizens with pro-immigration attitudes. Decisions to prosecute 
politicians for hate speech thus have important effects not just on supporters of the politician’s 
party, but also on other groups in society. 
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Many established European democracies are home to anti-immigration parties.1 While 
some have been more successful at the ballot box than others, their rise has been accompanied 
by controversy; several anti-immigration politicians have faced prosecution for inciting hatred. 
For instance, more than fifty Dutch and Belgian politicians have been prosecuted for hate 
speech2 in recent decades (Van Donselaar, 1995; Vrielink, 2010). This study provides an 
opportunity to examine citizens’ responses to prosecution of hate speech in a democratic setting 
using a full experimental design.  
A key component of Western democratic principles is respect for all people – the 
intended outcome of hate speech prosecution therefore includes protecting the rights of (ethnic, 
racial and religious) minorities and immigrants. The idea of prosecution is to send a message 
to actors seeking to violate this democratic principle, and to prevent worrisome political ideas 
as racism to spread. However, another component of liberal democracies is the notion of free 
speech, i.e. the possibility to express opinions even though this might be hurtful for groups of 
people. Free speech is protected in domestic and international legislation as a core democratic 
right (Weber, 2009). By prosecuting politicians for hate speech, government disseminates a 
signal that free speech is not without limits. Moreover, prosecution may lead to the removal of 
the politician from the political game, thereby narrowing the range of political candidates that 
 
1 Fennema (1997) defines anti-immigrant parties as a subtype of political party that has adopted the 
immigration issue as its core political concern, or are considered by elites of other parties to do so. We 
use the term anti-immigration parties, as they generally oppose immigration in an abstract sense rather 
than target particular immigrants (cf. Van Spanje, 2011). 
2 Hate speech is defined as “all forms of expression which spread, incite, promote or justify racial hatred, 
xenophobia, anti-Semitism or other forms of hatred based on intolerance, including intolerance 
expressed by aggressive nationalism and ethnocentrism, discrimination and hostility toward minorities, 
migrants and people of immigrant origin” (European Court of Human Rights, 2017). 
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citizens can elect. It is therefore hardly surprising that prior research demonstrated that many 
(Dutch) citizens strongly disagree with the prosecution of politicians for hate speech (Van 
Spanje and De Vreese, 2014). 
The thin line between hate speech and free speech has acted as a catalyst for many 
discussions. When the two values – protecting free speech and protecting minorities from 
discrimination – come into conflict, this presents a core challenge for governments of 
multicultural societies (Bleich, 2011; Vrielink, 2010). Should government protect free speech 
at all costs, or should they prosecute politicians who express disapproving views of members 
of a societal subgroup? This is a difficult consideration to make. Either way the government 
decides, they are compromising a fundamental principle of their way of governing. In that light 
it is relevant to assess how citizens react to each action that government can take – who will be 
satisfied with a decision to prosecute a politician, and who will not?  
One way to study citizens’ responses to hate speech prosecution is by studying the 
responses in their levels of democratic support, i.e., support for the norms and procedures of 
the democratic regime in their country (Dalton, 2004; Easton, 1975). Given that prosecution 
limits free speech and potentially citizens’ possibility to vote for the candidate representing 
their political attitudes, this may lower citizens’ levels of democratic support. At the same time, 
some citizens may perceive prosecution as a vital instrument to preserve democracy, which 
may increase their democratic support.   
Extant literature to the relationship between hate speech prosecution and democratic 
support is limited. Via using a quasi-experimental design, Van Spanje and De Vreese (2014) 
demonstrated that prosecuting an anti-immigration politician for hate speech lowered 
satisfaction with democracy among citizens who oppose multiculturalism. The current study 
corroborates this study’s findings by examining the effects of the decision to (not) prosecute a 
politician for hate speech using a full experimental design. In this way, confounding influences 
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(e.g., media attention for the trial) can be held constant, which allows to substantiate causal 
claims. We examine not only whether but also how a decision to (not) prosecute politicians for 
hate speech influences citizens’ democratic support via identifying two moderating factors. In 
line with prior research, we investigate if and to what extent agreement with the ideas expressed 
by the politicians in their alleged hate speech affects democratic support (i.e., advocating for 
assimilationism). The present study extends prior work by additionally testing whether or not 
identification with the politician’s party does. 
Studying how hate speech prosecution affects democratic support is relevant, as hate 
speech prosecution may not only affect those who (dis)agree with the content of the court case, 
but potentially also a broader group of citizens. Democratic support is key for a democracy’s 
preservation; for a democracy to survive, the democratic regime should be perceived by 
citizens as legitimate and appropriate for society, better than any other realistic alternative 
(Diamond, 1999). Low democratic support is related to several undesirable social and political 
outcomes, such as decreased political participation, civil obedience, and increased political 
violence (e.g., Aberbach and Walker, 1970; Dalton, 2004; Muller and Jukam, 1977). 
Particularly in times where many western European countries are divided over immigration 
and integration (ESS, 2016) and where anti-immigration parties are growing in popularity 
(Dennison and Geddes, 2019), more knowledge on the consequences of hate speech 
prosecution is needed. While the intended consequences are straightforward, there is both 
scientific and practical merit in increasing understanding of the side effects of decisions 
regarding the prosecution of anti-immigration politicians for hate speech. 
Theoretical Framework 
Democratic Support 
A stable democratic society requires that citizens believe in and respect the political 
system. Democratic support reflects citizens’ orientations toward the democratic nation-state, 
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its agencies, and actors, and involves both affective as evaluative aspects. In our 
conceptualization of democratic support, we rely on Easton (1965; 1975) and Norris (1999; 
2011). Easton distinguishes two types of political support: ‘specific support’ and ‘diffuse 
support’. Specific support refers to support for political authorities and authorities in public 
sector agencies, related to (an evaluation of) their decisions, policies, actions and utterances. 
Levels of specific support are assumed to be responsive to short-term contextual factors and 
may therefore fluctuate over time (Norris, 2011). Because it is impossible for governments to 
meet public expectations and demands at all time, a democratic system needs a “reservoir of 
support” that is unaffected by single actions and immediate policy outputs (Dalton, 1998, pp.3). 
This is referred to by Easton as ‘diffuse support’, which is a more stable sense of attachment 
that is less closely tied to government performance or to specific output, and more closely 
related to the legitimacy of the political community and system (Dalton, 2004).  
However, it can be difficult to link the two concepts to actual measures, and the 
distinction might be primarily conceptual rather than empirical (e.g., Anderson and Guillory, 
1997; Muller and Jukam, 1977). Research on democratic support often fails to acknowledge 
important distinctions of democratic support. The frequently used ‘satisfaction with 
democracy’-item seems to reflect both a general support for democracy as an abstract principle 
(diffuse support) as well as an evaluation of the functioning of democratic societies in practice 
(Canache et al, 2001).  
A key strength and contribution of the study is that we examine different dimensions 
of democratic support. Democratic support is a complex, multidimensional concept (Norris, 
1999; 2011) and should be treated as such. Rather than using the frequently used ‘satisfaction 
with democracy’-item, or by understanding democratic support as a two-dimensional concept, 
this study employs multiple-item indicators of democratic support. Based on Norris’ (1999; 
2011) renewed framework of political support, we conceptualize democratic support as a 
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concept consisting of four dimensions. These range from system affect to trust in politicians 
(see Methods). This allows for the idea that hate speech prosecution may have effects on some 
dimensions of democratic support, but not on others. Prosecution may for instance affect trust 
in politicians, without necessarily influencing one’s support for core democratic principles. 
Using these four dimensions provides a more thorough operationalization of democratic 
support, and thereby offers a possibility to validate prior research indicating the negative 
ramifications of hate speech prosecution for satisfaction with democracy (Van Spanje and De 
Vreese, 2014).  
The Moderating Role of Immigration Attitudes 
Rather than hypothesizing about a straightforward and unidirectional relationship 
between the decision to (not) prosecute a politician and democratic support, we argue that two 
factors may moderate this relationship: agreement with the political ideas spread by the 
prosecuted politician, and identification with the party of the prosecution politician.  
Easton (1965) argues that one powerful reason for the erosion of democratic support is 
authorities’ (e.g., judges, politicians, civil servants) incapacity or unwillingness to meet 
citizens’ demands, hence neglecting to act in line with citizens’ preferences, expectations and 
grievances. Easton (1965) claims that political systems consistently fail to address the demands 
of certain groups of citizens, the type of groups varying with historical moment and culture. 
Often the same groups in society feel structurally deprived of having their demands addressed, 
and subsequently the same types of citizens are more likely to lose faith in the democratic 
system. A decision to prosecute a politician for hate speech or not could signal for some citizens 
that the democratic system is not responsive, but the exact nature is likely to depend on whether 
citizens agree with the politician’s ideas. 
The effect of hate speech prosecution on democratic support is likely influenced by 
agreement with the ideas expressed by a politician in the statements for which he or she will 
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be prosecuted. Hate speech cases often deal with arguably discriminatory claims about 
immigrants and ethnic, racial or religious minorities (Van Spanje and De Vreese, 2014). In 
these messages, anti-immigration politicians often challenge that ethnic, racial and religious 
minorities – of which Muslims are a frequent target – are allowed to preserve “their” culture 
and are entitled to an egalitarian treatment (Levine and Hogg, 2010). In Europe, substantial 
segments of citizens hold negative attitudes toward immigration and immigrants (e.g., 
Semyonov et al, 2006), in particular toward immigrants from Muslim and poor countries 
(Heath and Richards, 2016). Despite being well represented in numbers, citizens with anti-
immigration attitudes arguably belong to a societal group who feel they are being structurally 
deprived of their political demands – i.e., demands regarding immigration and integration 
(Freeman et al, 2013). Most governments in European democracies systematically refuse to 
govern with anti-immigration parties (Akkerman and De Lange, 2012) and are (or are 
perceived to be) unwilling or unable to act according to these attitudes and to adopt very strict 
anti-immigration policies, while prior studies have shown that almost one out of two European 
citizens prefers less immigration (e.g., Pew Research Center, 2018). Extending this argument, 
citizens with anti-immigration attitudes may not only feel that their political demands are not 
met, but may even feel actively repressed or obstructed. 
Accordingly, citizens who are more negative toward immigration may feel that when 
anti-immigration politicians are prosecuted for hate speech, their own ideas are under attack as 
well, and that expressing criticism regarding immigration is no longer allowed. To phrase it in 
Easton’s formulation, authorities may not address these citizens’ demands, which may decrease 
their levels of democratic support. In line with Van Spanje and De Vreese (2014), who 
demonstrated that changes in citizens’ satisfaction with democracy following the decision to 
prosecute a politician for hate speech are conditional on citizens’ attitudes toward 
multiculturalism, we hypothesize that: 
TRIAL AND ERROR  8 
 
H1: The decision to prosecute a politician for hate speech decreases democratic support 
among citizens with more negative attitudes toward immigration. 
In contrast, citizens who are more positive toward immigration may feel that hate 
speech by an anti-immigration politician harms the ‘principle of equality’, that is the notion 
that all people, regardless of race, ethnicity and other criteria, are entitled to equal treatment 
and that minority rights should be protected (UN General Assembly, 1948). They may be more 
likely to agree that hate speech should be eradicated, even if this implies restricting politicians’ 
freedom of speech (Brems, 2002). By deciding to not prosecute a politician for hate speech, 
authorities may be perceived to disregard these citizens’ demands (i.e., protecting minorities’ 
rights). Consequently, this may decrease their levels of democratic support. We corroborate 
prior research by not only testing the effects of the decision to prosecute on democratic support, 
but by examining the effects of the decision to not prosecute as well. We expect that: 
H2: The decision to not prosecute a politician for hate speech decreases democratic 
support among citizens with more positive attitudes toward immigration. 
The Moderating Role of Ideological Affinity 
 Whereas agreement with the ideas of the prosecuted politician may influence 
democratic support, identification with the prosecuted politician’s party arguably may act as 
another moderator of the relationship between hate speech prosecution and democratic support. 
Identifying with the politician expressing the ideas might over-ride value-driven principles. 
Rather than exclusively testing the moderating role of agreement with the political idea (e.g., 
Van Spanje & De Vreese, 2014), we also examine the moderating role of identification with 
the party of the prosecuted politician. 
Party identification has been described as a “long term affective orientation” toward 
political objects (Campbell et al, 1960, pp.121): Political parties are perceived as one of the 
social groups with whom one may identify, resulting in a “partisan self-image” (Butler and 
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Stokes, 1974: pp.39; Miller and Shanks, 1996). As such, one’s identification with a party 
shapes the development of one’s attitudes. Any attack on the party or politicians (e.g., via 
prosecuting its party leader) then arguably feels like an attack on one’s norms, values and 
beliefs deeply rooted in this group membership: it could be seen as a ‘social identity threat’ 
(Grant and Brown, 1995; Voci, 2006).  
This traditional understanding of party identification, however, stems primarily from 
the US context, where two well-defined partisan and stable in- and out-groups exist (Democrats 
versus Republicans) which are each other’s direct adversaries. In multi-party systems, such as 
most Western-European democracies, party identification goes beyond a dichotomy between 
two opposites. In multi-party contexts, the partisan in-group encompasses not only the party 
one commonly votes for, but also parties that are ideologically close and hold comparable 
policy positions regarding core issues (Azrout and Wojcieszak, forthcoming; Johnston, 2006; 
Mayer and Schultze, 2018). Despite an international trend of partisan dealignment (Dalton, 
2000), the majority of Dutch citizens adheres to or has an affinity with a political party (Bankert 
et al, 2017) Prosecution may not only affect citizens who identify with the prosecuted 
politician’s party, but also those who have affinity with ideologically close parties:3 
H3: The decision to prosecute a politician for hate speech decreases democratic support 
among citizens who identify with the politician’s party or ideologically close parties. 
 
3 We did not formulate a hypothesis about the effects of people who identify with opposing parties, 
because we did not have a strong theoretical argument for doing this. Identification with a different 
party is likely an imperfect combination of agreement with the political idea and identification with the 
party, but this is not straightforward and these respondents may still differ in many other aspects. 
Moreover, in a multiparty and highly fragmented and volatile context as the Netherlands it is difficult 
to determine which party or politician should be included as ‘opposing’ party, as either all parties could 
be included, or only a few that are ideologically at the left end of the political spectrum. 
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Figure 1 presents our conceptual model and the three hypotheses derived from it. 
[Figure 1] 
Method 
The Case: Forum for Democracy (FvD) 
We conducted a web experiment in the Netherlands, where participants were exposed 
to a manipulated news story about the decision to (not) prosecute an anti-immigration politician 
for hate speech. We used a remake of an episode of ‘NOS in 60 seconds’ (‘NOS in 60 
seconden’). This Dutch news show features four stories about the most important daily news 
in one minute. The show is aired three times a day on television, but is also disseminated via 
the NOS website, social media (Twitter, Facebook) and via local television broadcasting 
channels. The episode originates from a popular, familiar and reliable television concept (NOS 
Journaal, the daily news program), one of the primary sources of information about social and 
political events (Eveland et al, 2005), produced by the Dutch public broadcaster NPO. The 
NPO is one of the largest and most popular Dutch news providers, and is considered as 
politically independent (Bos et al, 2014; Newman et al, 2018).  
To maximize ecological validity (Schmuckler, 2001), we used a television news story 
reporting about a politician of an existing Dutch anti-immigration party, namely Theo Hiddema 
of the ‘Forum for Democracy’ (FvD). While the party presents itself mainly as an anti-
establishment, anti-European Union (EU) party, it perceives immigration as highly problematic 
and believes that “foreigners” and ethnic minorities should assimilate with the dominant Dutch 
culture (Partijprogramma Forum voor Democratie, 2016). 
FvD lends itself to our manipulation for several other reasons too. First, FvD has two 
MPs and is therefore a relevant Dutch party. During the most recent provincial elections in the 
Netherlands, FvD received the most votes of all parties. This increases the likelihood that 
citizens pay attention to the news story and message about it. Second, the party is relatively 
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new; citizens may not have developed a fixed image or opinion about the party yet. Moreover, 
unlike the Freedom Party (PVV), the party has not been legally targeted before, implying that 
the party image is not yet affected by previous prosecution trials. Still, it is not unimaginable 
that the party or its politicians will be prosecuted for hate speech, which increases the credibility 
of the manipulation. Although Hiddema, the politician under study, is a relevant MP in Dutch 
politics, he is still less known than FvD party leader (Thierry Baudet), meaning that news 
stories about Hiddema can be more easily manipulated without participants noticing that the 
information provided is not true. Furthermore, the extensive news coverage of the party’s 
leader preceding the experiment – related to a rapidly increasing popularity of the party – could 
have influenced participants’ democratic support independent of the decision to (not) prosecute 
this politician for hate speech. Our analysis revealed no significant differences between the 
conditions in the extent to which FvD was perceived as a visible party in the public debate.4 In 
this way, priming effects are kept to a minimum. 
Design 
Our experimental design allows to substantiate causal claims, as confounding 
influences – such as the media attention resulting from a real-world event (Van Spanje and De 
Vreese, 2014) – can be held constant. The experiment relied on a between-subjects design, 
where participants were randomly assigned to one of three conditions: two experimental 
conditions in which the independent variable (‘Decision to (not) prosecute’) was manipulated 
and a control condition. To fully understand the ramifications of hate speech prosecution, it is 
necessary to compare with a situation without any treatment or manipulation of the independent 
 
4 The perceived visibility of FvD did not significantly differ across conditions, F(2,209) = 0.819, p = 
0.442, ηp2 = 0.008. 
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variable. A pilot study among Dutch university students (n = 157) demonstrated that the design 
was successful and that participants could not guess the study’s exact goal.  
Participants 
In total 304 subjects participated in the study (162 women, 142 men; Mage = 51, SDage 
= 18).5 Participants were recruited via the TNS NIPO online panel, where participants are 
rewarded in the form of money, gift cards, or charity donation for participating. Participants 
were randomly selected from subsamples, resulting in a sample largely representative of the 
Dutch electorate in terms of age, gender, education, area of residence, social class and voting 
behavior. Participants were randomly allocated to three conditions (Decision to prosecute: n = 
102; Decision to not prosecute: n = 105; Control condition n = 97). On average, participants 
completed the survey in 15 minutes. 
Stimuli material  
Subjects participated via an online link which was accompanied by a cover story 
mentioning that the goal of the study was to assess citizens’ reactions to news about societal 
issues. After several buffer items and moderators, participants were presented with a remake 
 
5 This study is part of a larger experiment (N = 984) with 11 conditions, but with only three relevant to 
our study (N = 308). From this sample, 4 participants were excluded from the dataset due to speeding 
(finishing the survey in less than 33 per cent of the median time) or straightlining (not differentiating 
between answer categories on 75 per cent of the question blocks). According to power analyses, our 
experimental conditions need 48 participants per condition to conduct the multivariate tests (See online 
supplementary file 5). The sample size per condition should therefore be sufficient for the multivariate 
test. For the between-subjects tests, we need 64 participants per condition. Although the initial sample 
size is sufficient, the missing values on the dependent variables and moderator variables make the final 
sample used for the between-subjects tests for immigration attitudes and perceived closeness to FvD 
just below the required sample size (N = 119 – 123). 
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of an episode of ‘NOS in 60 seconds’. Similar to the real newscast, the newscast used for this 
experiment featured four news stories of 15 seconds each. In the pilot study, the position of the 
manipulation news story in the newscast was randomized. However, since no order effects 
were found, we used one fixed order of items, in which the manipulated item was shown as the 
first item in the newscast. 
All audio-visual content was kept identical over all conditions, except for one news 
story about Hiddema, which contained the manipulation. For the three non-manipulation news 
stories, we opted for existing news items from three older ‘NOS in 60 seconds’-episodes. These 
items were unrelated to the topic of our study and were not too emotionally arousing. 
Furthermore, they did not contain references to temporal cues and specific events, as this would 
make the material less suitable to use for both the pilot study and the experiment. Furthermore, 
we opted for a broad range of themes (health, education and sports). The audio was recorded 
in a professional, soundproof studio by a professional voice-actor. 
All conditions featured a news story about Hiddema. This news story was custom-made 
for this experiment, but was kept as similar to the non-manipulation news stories as possible 
via using a similar number of frames and the same layout. For editing the news story about 
Hiddema, we made use of actually disseminated and real footage of Hiddema to increase the 
realism of the news story. This included footage of Hiddema delivering a speech to a Forum 
for Democracy party congress, Hiddema getting out of a car, and three frames of Hiddema 
walking around in the Dutch parliamentary building. 
All conditions featured the news story accompanied by a voice-over and subtitles 
mentioning that Hiddema came into disrepute for making public statements about Muslims 
(see Figure 2). As many first, second or third generation immigrants have an Islamic 
background (Maliepaard and Gijsberts, 2012), and considering previous hate speech messages 
by Dutch anti-immigration politicians, it seems more common (and therefore potentially more 
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credible and effective) for hate speech to refer to Muslims rather than to immigrants or 
immigration in general. No details about what was said in the alleged message were given to 
avoid contamination of the effects by idiosyncratic particularities of the case. Whereas 
condition 1 mentioned that the Public Prosecutor decided that Hiddema will be prosecuted for 
his statements about Muslims, condition 2 mentioned that the Public Prosecutor decided that 
Hiddema will not be prosecuted. The control condition also referred to statements about 
Muslims by Hiddema, but did not provide any information about a decision to prosecute him. 
A transcript of the manipulated news stories can be found in online supplementary file 1. 
After the newscast, participants in each condition answered questions regarding the 
dependent variable and several buffer items on a news story about education. This was followed 
by a manipulation check and a question about the study’s purpose. The concluding page of the 
survey included a thorough debriefing where participants were informed that the information 
provided about Hiddema was fictitious and was manipulated for research purposes. The 
experiment was authorized by the university’s institutional review board (IRB), and 
participants could withdraw their participation at any time. 
[Figure 2] 
Measures 
Democratic support. To account for the multidimensionality of democratic support, 
we operationalize democratic support using four dimensions. These dimensions are largely 
based on four of the dimensions outlined by Norris (2011).6 
The most diffuse form in this study is “system affect”, which involves a citizen’s belief 
that the democratic system defends the basic democratic norms and values a person believes in 
 
6 With minor adaptions, this conceptualization has been empirically tested by several scholars (e.g., 
Booth and Seligson, 2009; Norris, 2011; Zmerli and Newton, 2008). 
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(Muller and Williams, 1980). This is largely in line with Norris’ “approval of core regime 
principles and values” (7-point scale, α = 0.895; M = 4.79, SD = 1.43). This was measured by 
the Political Support-Alienation Scale (Muller et al, 1982). This scale consisted of the 
following three (originally eight) items (7-point Likert scale from 1 (‘completely disagree’) to 
7 (‘completely agree’)): “To what extent do you feel that the basic rights of citizens are well 
protected by our democratic constitutional state?”; “To what extent are you proud to live under 
our democratic constitutional state?”; “To what extent do you feel that you and your friends 
are well-represented in our democratic constitutional state?”. 
The second dimension is “evaluations of democratic performance”7, and represents the 
meso level of democratic support – the dimension that seems most difficult to measure (Norris, 
2011). Evaluations of democratic performance were measured via three items (7-point scale 
from ‘fully disagree’ to ‘fully agree’, α = 0.828, M = 4.68, SD = 1.36) (7-point Likert scale 
from 1 (‘completely disagree’) to 7 (‘completely agree’)): “In a democracy, the economic 
system runs badly”; “Democracies are indecisive and have too much quibbling”; “Democracies 
are not good at maintaining order”. The answers were recoded afterwards to a higher value 
indicating more democratic support. These items replace the more common ‘satisfaction with 
democracy’-item, measuring how citizens evaluate the functioning of democratic states 
without necessarily having to disregard general democratic principles (Linde and Ekman, 2003; 
Norris, 2011). These items are frequently used to measure citizens’ evaluations of the output 
 
7 As this study solely focuses on democratic support, we use the term “evaluations of democratic 
performance” instead of Norris’ “evaluations of the overall performance of the regime” (2011). 
Furthermore, “trust in politicians” is referred to as “trust in elected and appointed officeholders” in 
Norris’ conceptualisation (2011). We do not include the dimension “belonging to the national 
community” (e.g., national pride), as we do not expect substantial variation on this dimension in the 
Dutch context. 
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of a democratic system and the extent to which a democratic process is conducive to yield 
effective outcomes and form a reliable scale. 
The final two dimensions are “confidence in state institutions” (11-point scale, α = 
0.939; M = 4.97, SD = 2.37) and “trust in politicians” (similar to Norris’ “approval of 
incumbent office-holders” measure) (7-point scale, α = 0.902, M = 3.19, SD = 1.44). These two 
dimensions represent the most specific forms of democratic support. Confidence in state 
institutions was measured by the following question: “Please describe on a scale from 0 (‘no 
trust at all’) to 10 (‘very strong trust’) how much you personally trust each of the institutions”, 
followed by the following political institutions: parliament, the Public Prosecutor and the 
government (the first two originating from the European Social Survey (ESS)). Trust in 
politicians was measured by the following three items (7-point Likert scale from 1 (‘completely 
disagree’) to 7 (‘completely agree’)): “Most politicians leave their ideals or break their 
promises to gain more power”; “Most politicians talk a lot but do little to solve the true 
problems in our country”; “Most politicians are in politics for personal benefit”. This scale is 
a shortened version of the original Political Cynicism Scale (Citrin and Elkins, 1975). The 
answers were recoded afterwards to higher values indicating more trust in politicians. 
A principal component analysis with principal axis factoring (using Oblimin rotation) 
shows that the nine items form three scales as hypothesized; there were three components with 
an eigenvalue above 1 and the scree plot shows a point of inflexion after component 3 (See 
online supplementary file 2 for factor loadings). Together, these factors explain 80.5% of the 
variance in the original nine items. All factor loadings exceed 0.80, except for one item with a 
factor loading of 0.55. A principal component analysis (using Oblimin rotation) was conducted 
to analyze if this item should be removed from the scale. Because the eigenvalue decreases 
from 2.23 to 0.55 after removing an item, we have decided to include the item. Because 
confidence in state institutions was measured on a different scale and is a widely accepted and 
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validated measurement with high Cronbach’s Alpha, these items were not included in the 
principal axis factoring. 
 Pro-immigration attitudes. To measure attitudes toward immigration, we used a 
shortened version of the Modern Racism scale (McConahay et al, 1981). We asked participants 
to evaluate four statements about immigrants and immigration (7-point Likert scale from 1 
(‘completely disagree’) to 7 (‘completely agree’), α = 0.902, M = 3.48, SD = 1.57; a higher 
score representing more positive attitudes). “Immigrants should not push themselves where 
they are not wanted”; “Immigrants have more influence on political policies than they ought to 
have”; “Immigrants are getting too demanding in their push for better treatment”; “Over the 
years, immigrants have economically received more than they deserve”. The items were 
recoded afterwards to a higher score indicating more positive attitudes toward immigration. 
Ideological affinity. Ideological affinity was measured by two measures separately: 
affective and cognitive components of identification and perceived closeness to FvD in terms 
of left-right self-placement. The affective and cognitive party identification scale specifically 
referred to FvD (α = 0.934; M = 1.43, SD = 0.90). To hide the goal of the study, the same 
questions were repeated for two other Dutch political parties (SP (Socialist Party, left-wing) 
and CDA (Christian-Democratic Appeal, center/right-wing)) (order of parties randomized). 
The scale is an adapted version of Mael and Tetrick’s (1992) ‘Identification with a 
Psychological Group’ (IDPG) scale, established in social psychology and proven to be 
applicable to political parties (Brewer and Silver, 2000; Ohr and Quandt, 2012). The scale 
included four items on a 7-point Likert scale (from 1 (‘completely disagree’) to 7 (‘completely 
agree’)): “If someone criticises the Forum for Democracy, this feels as a personal assault”; “If 
I talk about the Forum for Democracy, I say “we” instead of “I””; “The successes of the Forum 
for Democracy are my successes”; “If someone praises the Forum for Democracy, this feels as 
a personal compliment”. Higher scores thus correspond to higher party identification. 
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Additionally, we measured perceived closeness to FvD. Because FvD is a relatively 
new party and party identification may not be very strong yet, we deemed it relevant to take 
into account political orientation as well. Considering the difficulties in establishing which 
party/parties to include, we used perceived closeness to FvD in terms of left-right self-
placement rather than a measure of identification with other parties. Perceived closeness to 
FvD was measured by subtracting perceived placement of FvD (M = 8.20, SD = 2.76, on a 
scale from 0 (‘left’) to 10 (‘right’)) from left-right self-placement. Left-right self-placement 
was measured on an 11-point scale by the question “In politics people sometimes talk about 
left and right. Where would you place yourself on a scale from 0 to 10, where 0 means the left 
and 10 means the right?” (M = 5.06, SD = 2.31). Final scores on perceived closeness ranged 
from -10 to 10 with negative scores pointing to participants placing themselves more left than 
FvD and positive scores pointing to participants placing themselves more right-wing than FvD 
(M = -2.03, SD = 3.90). These two measurements of party ID were preferred over vote choice 
for the reasons mentioned above: because the party’s popularity increased substantially 
between the last national election and the experiment, party vote might have presented an 
incorrect reflection of reality. 
To account for multicollinearity of anti-immigration attitudes and ideological affinity, 
we tested the correlation between them. Anti-immigration attitudes and ideological affinity are 
only moderately correlated: a correlation of r = 0.269 was found for anti-immigration attitudes 
and identification with the prosecuted politician’s party, and a correlation of r = 0.342 was 
found for anti-immigration attitudes and perceived closeness to the prosecuted politician’s 
party. 
Manipulation Check 
It was tested whether participants perceived the stimulus material correctly (Table 1). 
The vast majority noticed that the politician in the newscast was Hiddema. A large majority 
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perceived the stimuli correctly in the experimental conditions ‘decision to prosecute’ (69%) 
and ‘decision to not prosecute’ (72%).8 
[Table 1] 
Randomization check 
              No significant differences between the conditions were found in terms of the main 
sociodemographic variables and key predispositions, suggesting that randomization was 
successful (gender (F(1,302) = 0.550, p = 0.459); age (F(67,236) = 0.985, p = 0.517); education 
(F(6,297) = 0.480, p = 0.823); country of origin (F(12,291) = 0.515, p = 0.905) and political 
interest (F(6,297) = 0.565, p = 0.758). Hence, since randomization is successful, we do not 
include covariates in our models. As expected, including the demographics and predispositions 
as covariates did not significantly change the findings. We therefore did not include covariates. 
Correlations between the moderating and dependent variables per condition can be found in 
online supplementary file 3. 
Analysis          
             A multivariate analysis of variance (MANOVA) was conducted to examine mean 
differences between the conditions for the four dimensions of democratic support. There were 
no significant differences between the different conditions: F(8,410) = 0.521, p = 0.841, Wilk's 
Λ = 0.980, ηp2 = 0.010. MANCOVA (multivariate analysis of covariance) was used for the 
moderation analyses, with the decision to (not) prosecute as the categorical independent 
variable, immigration attitudes or ideological affinity as the continuous covariate and the 
different dimensions of democratic support as continuous dependent variables. A multivariate 
analysis (MANOVA) enables to avoid the problem of multiple tests (and the increased chance 
 
8 Removing participants with incorrect answers did not significantly change the findings. Because the 
results did not significantly differ, and removing participants may risk losing the benefits of 
randomization (Montgomery et al, 2018), we have decided to include all participants in the sample. 
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of Type I errors) that would arise if the dependent variables are tested separately. Because it 
uses correlations between dependent variables to provide a single p-value it is not necessary to 
apply a correction for a multivariate test, as there is no “multiple testing”. To understand which 
dimension(s) yield significant differences, we conducted univariate (between-subjects) tests 
for each dependent variable.9 Participants with missing values were excluded from the 
corresponding analyses (listwise deletion).    
Results 
Descriptives  
Democratic support is measured via four dimensions. Figure 3 shows that on average, 
participants show moderate to high democratic support. In all three conditions, means are the 
highest for the two most diffuse forms of support (system affect and evaluations of democratic 
performance). Means for the two more specific types of support, confidence in state institutions 
and trust in politicians, are lower. Table 2 shows the means and standard deviations for the 
moderating factors and dependent variables per condition. 




9 At this point, issues of multiple testing may arise. We did not apply a Bonferroni correction to the 
between-subjects tests, as this would imply that each p-value needs to be smaller than 0.003 to be 
statistically significant. Because the sample is relatively small and the power of the between-subjects 
tests is rather low, there is arguably a higher risk for Type II errors – the non-rejection of a false null 
hypothesis – than for Type I errors. Rather than exclusively focusing on p-values, we also include effect 
sizes (reported as partial eta squares). Effect sizes are more robust than p-values as they are independent 
of sample size and are more resistant to multiple testing. We also include visual explorations of the 
means for significant findings.  
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The Moderating Role of Immigration Attitudes 
The multivariate analysis showed a significant moderation effect of immigration 
attitudes for the decision to prosecute on democratic support (H1); F(4,112) = 2.920, p = 0.024, 
Wilk's Λ = 0.906, ηp2 = 0.094 (Table 3: full results in online supplementary file 4). This applies 
to system affect, F(1,115) = 5.973, p = 0.016, ηp2 = 0.049. The results also revealed a significant 
moderation effect on evaluations of democratic performance, F(1,115) = 4.418, p = 0.038, ηp2 
= 0.037. The effect sizes suggest small effects. This implies that the effect of immigration 
attitudes on support for democratic principles and evaluations of democratic performance is 
stronger for participants exposed to the ‘prosecution’ treatment than the control treatment. As 
Figure 4 and Figure 5 show, participants holding anti-immigration attitudes generally showed 
less system affect and evaluated democratic performance worse than participants with pro-
immigration attitudes. However, exposure to the ‘prosecution’ treatment (compared to 
exposure to the control treatment) lowered system affect and evaluations of democratic 
performance even more for citizens holding anti-immigration attitudes, while it increased 
system affect and evaluations of democratic performance for those with pro-immigration 
attitudes (Figure 4 and Figure 5). No significant moderation effects of immigration attitudes 
were found on confidence in state institutions, F(1,115) = 2.176, p = 0.143, ηp2 = 0.019, and 
trust in politicians, F(1,115) = 3.756, p = 0.055, ηp2 = 0.032. H1 was thus partly supported, for 





There is no statistically significant difference between participants in the ‘no 
prosecution’ group and participants in the control group in how immigration attitudes relate to 
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democratic support (H2): F(4,113) = 1.188, p = 0.320, Wilk's Λ = 0.960, ηp2 = 0.040. Tests of 
between-subjects effects showed the following results: system affect, F(1,116) = 0.181, p = 
0.672, ηp2 = 0.002; evaluations of democratic performance F(1,116) = 1.271, p = 0.262, ηp2 = 
0.011; confidence in state institutions, F(1,116) = 0.092, p = 0.762, ηp2=0.001; and trust in 
politicians, F(1,116) = 2.690, p = 0.104, ηp2 = 0.023. H2 is rejected.  
 The Moderating Role of Ideological Affinity 
H3 stated that the decision to prosecute a politician for hate speech would decrease 
democratic support among citizens who identify with the politician’s party. Ideological affinity 
was measured by perceived closeness to FvD in terms of left-right self-placement and 
identification with FvD. There is no statistically significant difference between participants in 
the ‘prosecution’ group and participants in the control group in how ideological affinity relates 
to democratic support. Results did not show a significant difference in democratic support 
based on the decision to prosecute and perceived closeness, F(4,116) = 1.070, p = 0.375, Wilk's 
Λ = 0.964, ηp2 = 0.036. Tests of between-subjects effects demonstrated that this applied to all 
four dimensions: system affect, F(1,119) = 0.341, p = 0.560, ηp2 = 0.003; evaluations of 
democratic performance, F(1,119) = 3.049, p = 0.083, ηp2 = 0.025; confidence in state 
institutions, F(1,119) = 0.000, p = 0.996, ηp2 = 0.000; trust in politicians, F(1,119) = 0.072, p 
= 0.790, ηp2 = 0.001. Identification with FvD did not show a moderating effect either, F(4,128) 
= 0.945, p = 0.440, Wilk's Λ = 0.971, ηp2 = 0.029. Again, this was true for all dimensions of 
democratic support: system affect, F(1,131) = 0.846, p = 0.359, ηp2 = 0.006; evaluations of 
democratic performance, F(1,131) = 0.805, p = 0.371, ηp2 = 0.006; confidence in state 
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institutions, F(1,131) = 0.008, p = 0.928, ηp2 = 0.000; trust in politicians, F(1,131) = 0.454, p 
= 0.502, ηp2 = 0.003. H3 is thus not confirmed. 
Table 4 shows an overview of the results per dimension of democratic support. 
[Table 4] 
Discussion 
Hate speech places governments in democratic societies in a difficult situation, as they 
are expected to protect free speech as well as minority rights. Particularly in times of 
polarization regarding diversity, integration and immigration (e.g., Berntzen et al, 2017), many 
citizens may find prosecution for hate speech inappropriate. Our main contribution is that our 
experimental approach allows to closely examine for which type of citizens exposure to hate 
speech prosecution yields ramifications for citizens’ levels of democratic support. We build 
upon prior research (Van Spanje and De Vreese, 2014), by examining both the effects of the 
decision to prosecute and the decision to not prosecute, and by focusing on citizens’ 
immigration attitudes as well as ideological affinity as moderating factors. 
As hypothesized, the effect of hate speech prosecution on democratic support is 
primarily influenced by agreement with ideas spread by the politician prosecuted for hate 
speech, rather than by identification with the party. Previous research by Van Spanje and De 
Vreese (2014) demonstrated that prosecuting an anti-immigration politician for hate speech 
lowers democratic support among citizens who are negative toward multiculturalism. Although 
attitudes toward multiculturalism and immigration attitudes are conceptually distinct, they are 
positively correlated.10 Hence, both studies suggest that it is the political idea spread in the 
alleged hate speech that is relevant, not the party or the politician. Around 35 percent of our 
sample – largely representative for the Dutch electorate – holds very negative attitudes toward 
 
10 r = 0.554** 
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immigration, whereas only 5 percent expresses very positive attitudes. These numbers are in 
line with prior research on immigration attitudes (e.g., Ceobanu and Escandell, 2010; 
Semyonov et al, 2006). The negative effects that hate speech prosecution seems to have for 
those with negative attitudes toward immigration may thus be consequential for a relatively 
large part of society. However, at the same time we found that the decision to prosecute the 
politician increased system affect and evaluations of democratic performance among those with 
pro-immigration attitudes. These citizens seem to perceive prosecution as an important 
instrument to defend democracy, and the democratic value to protect (ethnic, racial and 
religious) minorities from discrimination. Once more, this finding is in line with Van Spanje 
and De Vreese (2014), who found that citizens who became aware of the decision to prosecute 
a Dutch politician became more satisfied with democracy. This implies that hate speech 
prosecution also has beneficial effects on part of society. 
In future studies, we aim to address the (conceptual) understanding of hate speech 
(prosecution) and the mechanisms underlying these findings. Replicating our study with other 
political parties, and in contexts with different norms and laws regarding free speech (e.g., the 
United States) will improve our understanding of why democratic support lowers in some 
situations and for some citizens, but not for others. While the role of ideological affinity was 
limited in this study, its moderating effect may be more profound in countries where citizens 
hold stronger partisan identities. Furthermore, we recommend future researchers to replicate 
the experiment with various types of hateful messages, targeting different (minority) groups. 
Another approach to disentangle the effects would be to manipulate the strength of the 
message; In the current study, a deliberate choice was made not to emphasize the content of 
the hate speech message – to avoid particularities of the case to confound the effects – but this 
might explain the relatively small effects. To evoke stronger responses from participants, a 
more explicit content might be necessary. The small effects may also be due to ceiling effects, 
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as some participants may have more negative attitudes toward immigration and even lower 
democratic support than they reported. However, because the number of participants that 
reported the lowest score on both immigration attitudes and democratic support is small (less 
than 3% per dependent variable), we do not expect ceiling effects to be profound.  
This study also shows the importance of employing multiple-item indicators of 
democratic support, rather than the often used ‘satisfaction with democracy’-item – or a 
framework that forces a divide between diffuse and specific support. Hate speech prosecution 
affected the various dimensions of democratic support differently. The decision to prosecute 
for hate speech primarily seems to influence citizens’ system affect and evaluations of 
democratic performance, hence the diffuse and meso levels of democratic support, but has 
limited effects for confidence in state institutions – the most specific form of democratic 
support. While we did not a priori hypothesize about the effects of the decision to (not) 
prosecute on the various dimensions, this is a somewhat puzzling finding; Following the 
rationale behind diffuse and specific support (Easton, 1965; 1975), the decision to prosecute a 
politician for hate speech should maybe have more profound effects on the more specific forms 
of support. One potential explanation for these findings is that the stimulus material does not 
provide detailed information about who is responsible for the prosecution. Participants may be 
unsure if democratic institutions and politicians – the two most specific forms of democratic 
support – can be held directly responsible for the prosecution of Hiddema. The debate over 
hate speech prosecution touches directly on the legitimacy of the democratic system and 
democratic principles, and may therefore be more closely linked to system affect and 
evaluations of democratic performance. While some items may have a less intuitive connection 
to the decision to prosecute, such as the item that measures the evaluation of democracy – there 
might be spill-over effects via the other items. This warrants future in-depth examination. 
However, despite non-significant findings, both confidence in state institutions and trust in 
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politicians showed a similar trend (in the hypothesized direction) as system affect and 
evaluations of democratic performance. Replication studies among larger samples could reveal 
if these dimensions are simply not affected, or if the loss in power may partially explain the 
non-significant findings.  
As elaborated earlier, we did not apply a Bonferroni correction as the power of the 
between-subjects test is slightly lower than what is conventionally accepted for experimental 
research. We realize that this increases the likelihood of chance findings. However, we believe 
that the significant finding of the multivariate test indicates that there is a real effect, further 
indicated by the small but not negligible effect sizes and the visual exploration of the means. 
Concluding, we demonstrated that a decision to prosecute a politician for hate speech 
has negative consequences for citizens with more negative attitudes toward immigration. 
Hence, broader groups of citizens may be affected by the decision to (not) prosecute anti-
immigration politicians for hate speech, not only those who (do not) identify with the 
prosecuted politician’s party. Although the effects of a single exposure to a news item about 
hate speech prosecution may be short-term and mostly visible immediately after exposure to a 
news item, citizens will likely be repeatedly confronted with news about hate speech 
prosecution (as the Wilders trials have demonstrated). If effects partially disappear after a 
single news exposure, but are triggered by repeated confrontation, the effects on democratic 
support may cumulate. Repeated experiments, ideally with various politicians and measuring 
attitudes at multiple points in time, are necessary to confirm these expectations. In times when 
society is divided over immigration and integration, increasing awareness of the potentially 
negative consequences of hate speech prosecution is crucial.  
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Table 1 
Manipulation check experimental conditions 
Manipulation N in condition N correct % correct 
Decision to prosecute 
(Condition 1) 
102 70 68.6 
Decision to not prosecute 
(Condition 2) 
105 76 72.4 
Hiddema 304 245 80.6 
 
Table 2 




Alleged hate speech, 
decision to prosecute 
for hate speech  
(Condition 1) 
Alleged hate speech, 
decision to not 
prosecute for hate 
speech (Condition 2) 
Alleged hate speech 
mentioned,  






3.54 (SD = 1.72) 
N = 77 
3.54 (SD = 1.50) 
N = 86 
3.35 (SD = 1.51) 
N = 76 
Party identification 
(1-7) 
1.50 (SD = 1.05) 
N = 88 
1.38 (SD = 0.81) 
N = 83 
1.41 (SD = 0.83) 
N = 80 
Left-right self-
placement (0-10) 
6.33 (SD = 2.41) 
N = 98 
5.85 (SD = 2.15) 
N = 96 
6.23 (SD = 2.14) 
N = 90 
Perceived placement 
of FvD (0-10) 
8.11 (SD = 2.73) 
N = 80 
8.49 (SD = 2.53) 
N = 75 
7.99 (SD = 3.03) 
N = 69 
Perceived closeness 
to FvD  
(-10-+10) 
1.81 (SD = 3.99) 
N = 80 
2.53 (SD = 3.62) 
N = 73 
1.75 (SD = 4.07) 
N = 67 
System affect (1-7) 4.72 (SD = 1.35) 
N = 93 
4.76 (SD = 1.57) 
N = 90 
4.90 (SD = 1.38) 
N = 86 





4.71 (SD = 1.31) 
N = 79 
4.62 (SD = 1.41) 
N = 77 
4.72 (SD = 1.37) 
N = 72 
Confidence in state 
institutions (0-10) 
5.08 (SD = 2.33) 
N = 95 
4.81 (SD = 2.39) 
N = 94 
5.02 (SD = 2.40) 
N = 88 
Trust in politicians 
(1-7) 
3.14 (SD = 1.52) 
N = 93 
3.07 (SD = 1.45) 
N = 91 
3.14 (SD = 1.33) 
N = 88 
 
Table 3 
MANOVAs, multivariate analyses of variance; F, F-value; df, degrees of freedom; p, p-value; 
Eta, effect size estimates 
Source of 
variation 
Value F Df Error  
df 




      
Decision to 
prosecute 
0.943 1.689 4 112 0.157 0.057 
Attitudes toward 
immigration 





0.906 2.920 4 112 0.024 0.094 
Immigration 
attitudes (H2) 
      
Decision to not 
prosecute 
0.976 0.690 4 113 0.600 0.024 
Attitudes toward 
immigration 
0.972 0.803 4 113 0.526 0.028 








      
Decision to 
prosecute 
0.938 1.933 4 116 0.110 0.062 











0.964 1.070 4 116 0.375 0.036 
Party ID (H3)       
Decision to 
prosecute 
0.976 0.773 4 128 0.545 0.024 
Ideological 
affinity 





0.971 0.945 4 128 0.440 0.029 
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FIGURE 5. Evaluations of democratic performance (predicted values) by decision to 
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Table 4.  
Results per dimension 








H1 Confirmed Confirmed Confirmed Not confirmed Not confirmed 
H2 Not confirmed Not confirmed Not confirmed Not confirmed Not confirmed 
H3 Not confirmed Not confirmed Not confirmed Not confirmed Not confirmed 
 
